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ets of the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, Professor Currie has 
laid a solid foundation for further exploration in the fertile field of comparative 
constitutional law. 
MARKUS DIRK DUBBER 
SUNY Buffalo School of Law 
JAMES W. ELY, The Chief Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller 1888-1910. 
Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995. xii, 248 pp. 
$49.95. 
The twenty-two year period of the Fuller Court has often been regarded as a 
black hole of American Constitutional law whose twin low points are Plessy v. 
Ferguson' and Lochner v. New York.2 Much of the blame for its sorry perfor- 
mance has been laid at the doorstep of Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller who has 
been described as "the fifth best lawyer from the City of Chicago," a phrase meant 
to heap praise neither on the man nor the city. Its commitment to economic devel- 
opment, market institutions and limited government made it the target of the pro- 
gressive criticisms that bore fruit in the New Deal reforms less than two genera- 
tions later. 
Today the new rise of conservative (broadly conceived) thinking has chal- 
lenged this dismal portrait of the Fuller Court on philosophical and economic 
grounds. The conventional view of twenty years ago-that more government 
leads to a better and more justice society-no longer captures the political imagi- 
nation of vast portions of the electorate, and the phrase "laissez-faire" once again 
is seen as a badge of honor and not some dismissive epithet. The shift in these 
broad political and philosophical undercurrents have also brought forth a parallel 
revisionism in the legal history. Ely's fine book on Melville Fuller and the 
Supreme Court over which he presided usefully complements the current theoreti- 
cal counterattack. His patient, balanced and careful study should do much to 
restore the Fuller Court to its fair measure of institutional and intellectual 
respectability. 
The first surprise is the evident quality of the man himself. Ely details 
Fuller's skillful handling of the often tense meetings among the Justices; his good 
judgement in deciding whether or when to accept Presidential, diplomatic or legal 
assignments; his excellent oratory on ceremonial occasions; and the energy and 
productivity of his own judicial labors. Here was a man whom Holmes thought 
was the best Chief Justice under whom he served. Whatever we may have thought 
about him, Fuller was no mediocrity. (pp. 53-54) 
More to the point, Ely's balanced and careful picture of the major doctrinal 
developments of the Fuller Court avoids the frequent sin of historical caricature. 
His discussion, for example, of the Fuller Court's response to rate regulation of 
the railroads and public utilities effectively counters the view that the Court's due 
process jurisprudence was an unwarranted and meddlesome interference with leg- 
islative prerogatives. He nicely chronicles the Court's hostile response to the early 
regulatory overreaching of the Interstate Commerce Commission; he accurately 
reviews many of the major rate-of-return regulation decisions, culminating Smyth 
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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v. Ames,3 and he neatly turns the shoe on the other foot by noting that the Fuller 
Court's respect for federalism often induced it to keep hands off state rate regula- 
tions of a distinctly confiscatory nature. (pp. 83-94) 
The Fuller Court's commitment to federalism goes a long way to explain the 
Fuller's narrow (and correct) reading of the commerce clause in E.C. Knight Co.4 
But that same concern did not require the Fuller Court to give an unnecessarily 
narrow construction to the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of individual 
rights against the state action. Yet throughout this period, Ely shows that the 
Fuller Court often gave the takings clause a narrow reading by sustaining, for 
example, Boston's height regulation on a dubious fire prevention rationale5 and 
provided scandalously little protection to owners of riparian rights.6 (pp. 104-105) 
More importantly its deference to the state exercise of the police power led to the 
disastrous support of separate-but-equal decision on Plessy and the forced separa- 
tion of the races in Berea College v. Kentucky,7 where the state's power to issue 
corporate charters on condition was used to force private institutions to practice 
racial segregation against their will. 
The clear lesson of this history is that the greatest sin of the conservative 
Fuller Court lay in its failure to take its jurisprudence of individual rights and lim- 
ited government far enough. Lochner stood for a narrow conception of the police 
power: Plessy and Berea College stood for the far broader one. No court needs any 
ad hoc conceptions of fundamental rights or suspect classifications to guard 
against legislative abuse if it applies a beefed-up Lochner across the board. An 
abiding and consistent suspicion of state power could have spared this nation 
much of its subsequent racial turmoil. Ely shows perhaps too much sympathy for 
the Fuller Court's worst decisions and a bit too little praise for its best ones. 
Notwithstanding his own sound philosophical biases, he cannot quite bring him- 
self to admit that Fuller Court should have pushed the strong and enduring princi- 
ples of limited government to their logical and proper conclusion. 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN 
The University of Chicago 
3. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). 
4. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
5. Welch v. Swasey,. 214 U.S. 91 (1909). 
6. See, e.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900). 
7. 211 U.S. 45 (1908). 
STEPHEN C. HALPERN, On the Limits of the Law: The Ironic Legacy of Title VI 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995. xiv, 391 pp. $55.00 (cloth). $18.95 (paper). 
Stephen C. Halpern's scholarly monograph has two great virtues. It is sound 
in its treatment of complex legal questions, and it presents and develops an inter- 
esting thesis. Yet one wonders about the audience for the book. Readers who are 
not already knowledgeable about civil rights law will have to struggle with thick 
legalistic prose, while experts in the field will already be familiar with much of 
the story. 
The book deals with the enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, a provision that authorized the denial of federal funds to any program that 
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 13:31:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
